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Introduction
Excessive risk-taking by …nancial institutions is widely regarded as the main cause of the global …nancial crisis in [2007] [2008] (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009 ).
Prior to the crisis, banks invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities, the risk of which was grossly underestimated, while at the same time relying increasingly on short-term borrowing for funding. As real estate markets weakened and losses on mortgage-backed securities mounted, the equity capital of many banks was quickly wiped out and uncertainty about the solvency of counterparts caused money markets to freeze (Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Shin, 2009 ). To avoid a collapse of the entire …nancial system, governments intervened by providing banks with credit lines, loan guarantees and new capital (Laeven and Valencia, 2013) . While the collapse was avoided at a staggering cost, the crisis nevertheless spread to the real economy where …rms su¤ered from the ensuing decline in lending by troubled banks (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Santos, 2011; ChodorowReich, 2013 ).
By making it painfully clear that distressed banks can impose very signi…cant costs on tax payers, other banks and non-…nancial …rms, the …nancial crisis has revived an old debate about government intervention in the …nancial sector. Many scholars have argued in favor of tightening capital requirements (e.g. Admati et al., 2010; Hart and Zingales, 2011 ). This stance is supported by the theoretical arguments that banks with more capital have more incentives to monitor borrowers (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2011) and less incentives to invest in excessively risky assets (Acharya, Mehran and Thakor, 2011) and by empirical analysis showing that banks with more capital generally fare better during a …nancial crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) .
In response to the crisis, the Basel capital requirements, the cornerstone of international …nancial regulation, have indeed been strengthened moderately.
Recognizing that externalities can be addressed with taxation as well as regulation, a number of countries, including the UK and Germany, have introduced a new type of bank levy proposed by the IMF (2010). The bank levies typically fall directly on bank borrowing and have a clear Pigouvian rationale: given that the social cost of bank distress exceeds the private cost, there is scope for a corrective tax on the types of bank funding that increase the risk of distress. By raising the cost of borrowed funds, the levies are designed to increase stability in the …nancial sector by inducing banks to rely more on own capital. Some levies have more elaborate features, most of which can be rationalized within a Pigouvian framework. In the UK and Netherlands, for instance, short-term borrowing is taxed at a higher rate than long-term borrowing since the former involve a larger re…nancing risk than the latter (Perotti and Suarez, 2011) . In Germany and other countries, the levy rate structure is progressive presumably re ‡ecting that the external cost of bank failure is higher for large banks than for small banks. This paper studies how banks responded to the levies with the ultimate aim of assessing whether the levies have been successful in reducing risk in the …nancial sector.
We draw on detailed information from the …nancial reports of more than 5,000 European banks and exploit that the adoption of bank levies constitutes a rich natural experiment with several types of variation. First, 11 countries in the European Union ("EU") adopted levies over the period 2009-2011 while the remaining 16 countries did not. Second, levy rates vary substantially between countries that have adopted a levy. Third, marginal levy rates vary within countries both in the cross-sectional dimension due to progressivity in the rate structure and in the time dimension due to rate changes. We exploit all these types of variation in a panel model that spans the period 2008-2011. The model includes standard determinants of capital structure at the bank and country levels as well as bank …xed e¤ects to capture the permanent components of capital structure (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008) .
Our …rst main …nding is that bank levies had a statistically and economically signi…cant e¤ect on banks' funding choices. Speci…cally, our results suggest that banks raised their equity-asset ratio by 1 to 1.5 percentage points on average in response to the levies. This holds in a range of di¤erent speci…cations and is robust to the inclusion of region-speci…c, bank-size speci…c and equity-ratio speci…c non-linear time trends where identi…cation e¤ectively derives from comparisons of banks within the same region, of the same approximate size and with the same approximate equity-asset ratio. The causal interpretation of the estimates is further supported by the …nding that banks a¤ected by the levies had the same pre-levy trends in equity-asset ratios as other banks and by a placebo test on a sample of large non-…nancial …rms.
These results suggest that bank levies can be quite successful in reducing banks' funding risk. The banks in our sample initially had an equity-asset ratio of around 0.13, so the benchmark estimate of 0.015 suggests that bank levies caused an increase in the equity-asset ratio of an average bank of more than 10%. Importantly, we …nd that the increase in equity-asset ratios is driven by an increase in the stock of equity rather than a decrease in the stock of assets. This matters for policy purposes if there are concerns that banks may respond to the levies by slashing lending to households and non-…nancial …rms to the detriment of the real economy.
Our second main …nding is that bank levies, despite changing directly only the incentives underlying banks' funding choices, also had an e¤ect on banks' portfolio choices.
Speci…cally, we …nd that banks changed their portfolio of assets in response to the levies so as to increase the average regulatory risk weight by around 3%. We argue that this is likely to be the result of an unintended interaction with …nancial regulation, which imposes a minimum ratio of bank capital to risk-weighted assets. Hence, to the extent that banks raise more capital because of the levies, they are also able to increase the risk of their assets while still complying with the regulatory capital requirements.
These results suggest that the bank levies, which are designed to reduce the risk of the …nancial sector, actually lead to an increase in banks'portfolio risk. This result relates to a classical theoretical literature on risk shifting, which shows that when regulators limit banks' funding risk by imposing capital requirements, banks optimally undo the e¤ect on their total risk, at least partly and sometimes more than fully, by taking on more portfolio risk (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988) . It also relates to recent theoretical analysis of the interaction between banking regulation and taxation (Keen, 2011 ).
An important limitation of these results is our crude measurement of portfolio risk.
While it is well-known that regulatory risk weights are imperfect measures of portfolio risk (Hellwig, 2010) , they are frequently used in the literature (e.g. Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Rime, 2001; Keen and de Mooij, 2012) and have been shown to correlate with outcomes such as the share of non-performing loans and bank failure (Avery and Berger, 1991) . Regardless of their correlation with true portfolio risk, regulatory risk weights are perfectly suited to detect portfolio changes in response to the bank levies if, as we argue, the levies a¤ect portfolio choices through an interaction with regulation.
Our third set of …ndings concern the heterogeneity in banks'responses to the bank levies. We show that while banks with a high initial level of capital increased their equityasset ratio most in response to the levies, only banks with a low initial level of capital increased the risk of their assets. The latter …nding supports the interpretation that the indirect e¤ect of levies on portfolio choices is due to the interaction with …nancial regulation, which is more likely to be a binding constraint for banks with low levels of capital.
These results suggest that the intended behavioral response, the decrease in funding risk, was largest in relatively safe banks whereas the unintended response, the increase in portfolio risk, occurred only in relatively risky banks. This seems to imply that the levies were more successful in reducing total risk in initially safe banks than in initially risky banks. We obtain this result directly by using the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, which captures both funding risk (in the numerator) and portfolio risk (in the denominator), as a measure of total risk. We …nd that the e¤ect of the levies on this measure was signi…cantly positive for banks with a high initial level of capital and precisely zero for banks with a low initial level of capital.
The main contribution of the paper is to evaluate a new type of government intervention in the …nancial markets: levies on bank borrowing have already been introduced in important banking centers such as the U.K. and Germany with the aim of enhancing …-nancial stability and are currently under consideration in many other countries including the U.S. Our assessment of the levies is somewhat mixed: there is evidence that banks have reduced funding risk considerably in response to the levies, but it also appears that some banks have undone the e¤ect on total risk by taking on more portfolio risk. Specifically, the levies seem to have reduced risk in the relatively safe banks while there are no signs that they have curbed risk in the relatively risky banks, which presumably pose the greatest threat to …nancial stability.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 provides background information about the bank levies; Section 3 sets out a brief conceptual framework linking funding and portfolio risk and analyzing the impact of a bank levy; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 concludes.
The bank levies
In the wake of the …nancial crisis, the IMF promoted levies on the risky part of bank funding as a tool to increase revenue collection from the …nancial sector while at the same time contributing to …nancial stability by incentivizing banks to adopt less risky capital structures. Bank levies of some form have been adopted in a number of countries and are still under consideration in many others. In the US, for instance, the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee was …rst proposed by the Obama Administration in 2010 and is included in its budget proposal for 2014. Table 1 describes key characteristics of the 14 bank levies that had been implemented in the EU by the end of 2012. 1 The most common levy design adopted by 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Netherlands, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK) taxes some measure of bank liabilities. While the levies are conceptually very similar, some variation exists. First, most of the levies fall on total liabilities net of customer deposits that are guaranteed under a deposit insurance scheme, but two countries (Cyprus and Portugal) include insured deposits in the levy base. Second, most levies treat short-term and long-term liabilities symmetrically, but two countries (UK and the Netherlands) apply a reduced rate to liabilities with a maturity exceeding one year.
Third, most of the levies apply a ‡at rate, but four countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands and the UK) have a progressive rate structure where small banks are taxed at lower rates than large banks or not taxed at all. Finally, the UK rules have several provisions that narrow the taxable base, which are not found in other countries: most notably, they allow for the netting of gross assets and liabilities against the same counterpart and grant a deduction for highly liquid assets. Three countries (France, Hungary and Slovenia) have adopted bank levies that are conceptually quite di¤erent from the design described above. In France, the taxable base is the minimum amount of capital necessary to comply with the regulatory requirements.
In Hungary, the bank levy falls on total assets net of inter-bank lending. In Slovenia, the taxable base is total assets with no deductions, however, the levy is not due if either the level of lending to the non-…nancial sector or the growth in lending to the non-…nancial sector exceeds a threshold. It is not immediately clear how we should expect these three levies to a¤ect banks'funding and portfolio choices. None of them directly change the incentives underlying funding choices and while one should expect the French levy to cause a decrease in portfolio risk, this is not obvious for the Hungarian and Slovenian levies. Because of these ambiguities, most of our empirical analysis omits the French, Hungarian and Slovenian banks from the sample and focuses on the 10 bank levies that fall on a similar and well-de…ned measure of bank liabilities.
It is important to note that several other policy initiatives aiming to enhance stability in the …nancial sector may directly and indirectly have a¤ected banks'funding and portfolio choices. First, the new international framework for …nancial regulation, Basel III, to be phased in from 2013 will increase the minimum capital requirements in terms of risk-weighted assets and introduce a minimum leverage ratio in terms of total consolidated assets. It is likely that banks anticipating future regulatory requirements started adopting their capital structure already during our period of analysis. Note, however, that bank capital requirements are regulated at the EU level, hence it seems safe to assume that two otherwise similar banks located in two di¤erent countries within the EU were a¤ected similarly by the regulatory changes. Second, in the aftermath of the …-nancial crisis many governments intervened in the banking sector by providing distressed banks with new equity and by guaranteeing their debt to third parties. In the countries most adversely a¤ected by the crisis, these measures were very signi…cant in size. In 
Conceptual Framework
We argued loosely in the introduction that a levy on bank liabilities should be expected to a¤ect not only banks'funding choices but also their portfolio choices because of the interaction with bank regulation. To illustrate this mechanism, we develop a simple model of bank behavior in the presence of regulation and a bank levy. The model draws on Keen and de Mooij (2012), but extends it along several dimensions, notably by treating both funding and portfolio structure as fully endogenous outcomes. The model is not intended to capture all the complex channels through which a levy may a¤ect bank choices and therefore makes a number of simplifying assumptions to focus on the channel that we believe is key, the interaction between the levy and bank regulation.
2
A bank raises funds equal to 1, of which a fraction E 0 is in the form of equity and the remaining fraction L is in the form of debt. The bank invests a proportion of its funds into risky assets with an uncertain, but on average positive, return 1, and the remaining proportion 1 into a risk-free asset rate with a return that we normalize to zero. The cumulative distribution function of is F ( ). A bank levy at rate T is levied on L. Shareholders have limited liability. Abstracting from a potential regulatory penalty described below, the value of the equity of the bank after one period is therefore:
Inside the bracket, the …rst two terms are the values of the two types of assets, the third term is the liability to the lenders and the tax liability. If this is negative, then the bank defaults, and the shareholders receive zero. Lenders charge an interest rate of R. We assume that creditors of the bank are fully insured depositors. However, we also assume that the bank is large enough to exert some market power. As a result, it may need to increase the interest rate that it pays to depositors in order to borrow more. We capture this by making the interest rate a function of borrowing, R L > 0. To simplify here, we assume that this relationship is linear, so that R LL = 0; this is not crucial.
At the end of the period, the value of risk-weighted assets is . The Basel regulatory requirement is that the ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets exceeds the minimum value, denoted B; that is:
Given the initial choice of debt and the asset portfolio, the bank will fail to meet the Basel requirement if the realized value of the risky assets is below a cut-o¤ value,
B
given by:
In the event of not meeting the Basel requirement, the bank faces a penalty P proportional to the shortfall in equity. Letting E B denote the amount of equity that satis…es the Basel requirement, the penalty amounts to:
where c is the penalty rate. The penalty reduces the value of E so that default occurs if:
Given the initial choice of debt and risk, the bank will default if the rate of return on risky assets is below a cut-o¤ value, D given by
Note that D < B so that there is a range of realizations of where the bank fails to meet the Basel requirement but does not default.
The bank makes funding and portfolio choices to maximize the return to the shareholders. It is convenient to express this as the expected value of equity at the end of the period, net of the potential penalty, and also net of the opportunity cost of equity …nance, . In principle, re ‡ects the risk inherent in owning the bank's equity; however we simplify by assuming that it is …xed. Hence, the bank chooses L and to maximize:
The derivatives of W with respect to L and can be stated as:
and It follows from (7) that a small increase in leverage changes the return to the shareholders through two channels: it a¤ects funding costs by reducing the opportunity cost of equity …nance by (…rst term) while at the same time increasing the cost of debt …nance by R + T + LR L in all states of the world where the bank does not go bankrupt (second term). It also adds to the penalty in all the states of the world where equity falls short of the Basel requirement but the bank does not go bankrupt (third term). Likewise, (8) shows that a small increase in asset risk changes W through two channels: it increases the expected return to assets (…rst term) but also adds to the penalty in all the states of the world where equity falls short of the Basel requirement but the bank does not go bankrupt (second term). Based on these insights, it is relatively straightforward to show how a bank levy shapes banks'optimal funding and portfolio choices:
Proposition 1 A levy on bank debt induces banks to reduce its leverage (dL=dT < 0) and increase its asset risk (d =dL > 0)
Proof. See the Appendix Intuitively, if R is low, a bank can lower its funding costs by relying more on debt …nancing. It can also raise its expected investment return by investing more in risky assets. In the presence of bank regulation, however, banks balance these positive e¤ects of risk-taking with a negative e¤ect in the form of a higher penalty in the states of the world where equity falls short of the Basel requirement. When a levy on bank liabilities is introduced, the cost saving associated with debt …nancing is lowered, which induces the bank to rely less on debt and more on equity. This, in turn, implies that there are fewer states of the world in which the banks does not meet the Basel requirement and, hence, a lower marginal cost of increasing portfolio risk. In the new optimum, the bank therefore takes less funding risk and more portfolio risk.
While the model does not explicitly account for bank heterogeneity, it is fairly obvious that the mechanism we have modeled, by which a bank levy causes banks to increase portfolio risk, only applies to banks that are e¤ectively constrained by the Basel requirement. If a bank, for reasons outside the model, initially has so much equity that the risk of violating the Basel requirement were zero, a further reduction in debt …nancing in response to a bank levy does not change the marginal costs and bene…ts of portfolio risk. We therefore conjecture that the positive e¤ect of the bank levy on portfolio risk is larger for banks that are initially closer to the Basel constraint.
Data and measurement
Our main source of data is Bankscope, which contains information on balance sheets, income statements and regulatory reports taken from banks' annual reports. Table 2 summarizes balance sheet and regulatory information for the full sample of 5,087 banks from 27 European countries for the time period 2008-2011. As shown in column (2), the main source of funding for the average bank in the sample was customer deposits, which accounted for around 53% of total assets, whereas deposits from other banks accounted for around 17% and equity accounted for around 13%. 4 The average bank lent around 53% of its funds to customers, around 16% to other banks and held around 21% in securities. Finally, the average bank reported a regulatory capital ratio of around 16%
and an average regulatory risk weight of assets of around 59%. 5 Note that not all banks publish regulatory information, hence the number of observations drops considerably when we move from balance sheet information to regulatory measures. Only around 60%
of the banks in our sample disclose information about their regulatory capital ratio in their …nancial statements and only about 40% additionally report the stock of regulatory capital, which is required to back out the average risk weight. Table 2 around here
We also report variable means separately for four subsamples. The key distinction in our empirical analysis is between banks that are subject to a levy and banks that are not. We therefore split the bank sample on whether the home country introduced a bank levy at some point during the period 2008-2012. As reported in columns (4)- (7), banks in levy countries and non-levy countries are reasonably comparable in terms of observable characteristics although banks in levy countries are somewhat larger, rely slightly more on deposits and less on long-term borrowing for …nancing and have somewhat riskier assets than banks in other countries. Moreover, an important endeavor of the paper is to investigate whether bank responses to the levies correlated with the extent to which they were constrained by regulation. For this purpose we split the sample on whether the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets was above or below the sample median in 2008. As reported in columns (8)- (11), banks with high regulatory capital ratios were a lot smaller, relied more on equity and had slightly less risky assets than banks with low regulatory capital ratios.
The dependent variables are formed on the basis of these data. Our measure of funding risk is the ratio of equity to total assets both measured at book value. For several reasons, book values are more appropriate than the market values for our purposes. First, we would like our measure of funding risk to depend on the funding structure but not on the portfolio structure. While the book value of equity is una¤ected by portfolio choices, at least until these choices give rise to gains or losses, the market value of equity is likely to re ‡ect all types of risk. Second, we are ultimately interested in active responses to the bank levies, such as share issues and changes in dividend policy, and we would therefore like to purge our measure of funding risk from the in ‡uence of other factors to the greatest extent possible. This suggests that book values are more suitable than market values, because the latter but not the former are a¤ected by changes in expectations about future income and costs. One example of this mechanism is the bank levies themselves, which represent future costs for the banks and may therefore mechanically drive down the market value of equity holding banks'funding and portfolio choices constant.
Our measure of portfolio risk is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets or, equivalently, the average regulatory risk weight of assets. It is well-known that regulatory risk weights are far from perfect measures of true portfolio risk. Since the adoption of the Basel II agreement, many banks have relied on their own estimates of the risk of assets and some commentators have expressed concern that the use of internal risk models have allowed banks to e¤ectively circumvent the regulatory capital requirements by understating portfolio risk (e.g. Haldane, 2013) . Despite their weaknesses, regulatory risk weights are probably the best available measure of portfolio risk and have been used extensively in the literature on bank responses to …nancial regulation (e.g. Rime, 2001) and taxation (Keen and de Mooij, 2012). Moreover, since the risk weights correspond precisely to the regulatory de…nition of portfolio risk, it is exactly this measure that should change if banks whose risk taking is e¤ectively constrained by the regulatory capital requirements shift risk from the liability side of their balance sheet to the asset side in response to the levies.
Our measure of total risk is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets.
This ratio captures both funding risk and portfolio risk and is the key variable used by …nancial regulators to assess the risk of individual banks. By incorporating the regulatory risk weights, it obviously su¤ers from the same measurement problems as the risk weights themselves.
The main explanatory variables concern the bank levies. Combining hand collected information from national legal texts, a survey by KPMG (2012) and other notes by professional tax advisers in the relevant countries, we have created a comprehensive database with detailed information on the bank levies, which is available in the Online Data Appendix. 6 Drawing on this database, we construct two variables that capture the incentives facing banks. First, we construct a dummy variable for the existence of a bank levy at the country-year level. This variable is useful for policy evaluation purposes because it allows us to estimate the average e¤ect of the levies that have been implemented on the outcomes of interest. Since we are interested in behavioral responses to the levies and the Austrian levy was e¤ectively retroactive for 2011-2013, we code the dummy variable zero for this country. Second, we construct a measure of the marginal levy rate, which we de…ne as the additional levy cost associated with a unit increase in 6 Available at the webpage: www.nielsjohannesen.net.
Results

Funding risk
We …rst explore the e¤ect of bank levies on funding risk by estimating the extent to which the levies induced banks to rely more on equity funding. As a …rst step, we estimate the following baseline model:
where ic denotes bank …xed e¤ects, t denotes time …xed e¤ects and X ict and Z ct are Columns (4)- (6) show that the positive e¤ect of levies on the equity-asset ratio remains when using the estimated marginal levy rate as explanatory variable. The estimated coe¢ cient is highly signi…cant across the three speci…cations. The coe¢ cient in column (6) of around 0.26 suggests that banks subject to the UK marginal levy rate of 0.075% on average increased their equity-asset ratios by around 2 percentage points relative to banks subject to a zero marginal levy rate.
It is conceivable that the baseline results are driven by other shocks, which had a signi…cant impact on bank capital structure and which were correlated with the implementation of levies. We address this concern in a number of robustness tests reported in Table 4 . in Southern Europe were less likely to adopt bank levies than governments in other regions, this could cause a positive correlation between bank levies and equity ratios. We control non-parametrically for regional shocks by including region-speci…c time dummies in the model. We de…ne …ve geographical regions, each of which includes at least one country that has introduced a levy and at least one country that has not, and augment the model with interactions between region dummies and time dummies. 7 Note that in this speci…cation, identi…cation of the levy variables derives exclusively from within-region comparisons of banks that were subject to a levy and banks that were not. Column (2) shows that the e¤ect of the bank levies is robust to region-speci…c non-linear time trends.
Third, small banks and large banks exhibit signi…cant di¤erences in funding and portfolio structure, hence banks of di¤erent sizes may have been exposed di¤erently to the sovereign debt crisis and other major shocks to the …nancial sector during the sample period. If exposure to bank levies also correlates with size, for instance because of progressive levy rate structures or because countries with larger banks were more likely to adopt a bank levy, the baseline model produces biased estimates. We control for shocks Fourth, it is plausible that highly leveraged banks faced a strong market pressure to reduce leverage in the wake of the …nancial crisis. If countries with more leveraged banks were also more likely to adopt a bank levy, the baseline model would produce biased estimates. Analogous to the procedure applied above, we control for factors a¤ecting banks with di¤erent leverage di¤erentially by including equity ratio-speci…c time dummies in the model: for each decile in the distribution of equity-asset ratios in 2008 we construct a dummy and include its interactions with the time dummies in the baseline model.
Column (4) shows that the coe¢ cients on the levy variables hardly change. Fifth, column (5) shows that the bank levies remain economically and statistically signi…cant when simultaneously including controls for other government interventions as well as regionspeci…c, bank size-speci…c and equity ratio-speci…c time dummies.
Another possible concern is that the levy variables may pick up pre-existing di¤erential trends in equity ratios. If banks hit by a levy were for some reason on di¤erent trajectories than other banks, this could show up in the estimated e¤ects of the levies. To address this concern, we …rst construct a dummy variable for banks facing a positive marginal levy rate as well as three dummy variables indicating one year, two years and three years before marginal levy rate turned positive. We then estimate the baseline model with these variables. 8 As illustrated in Figure 1 , the coe¢ cients on the pre-levy dummies are small and insigni…cant suggesting that the pre-levy trend in equity-asset ratios did not di¤er between banks that were hit by a levy and those that were not. Figure 1 around here Finally, we conduct two placebo tests and report the results in Table 5 . First, we estimate the e¤ect of bank levies on the equity-asset ratios of non-banks. 9 If the estimated e¤ect on banks were driven by unobserved shocks at the country-level, e.g. an increased supply of equity capital or pressure from investors to reduce leverage, it should be expected that such shocks would a¤ect non-banks similarly. Columns (1)- (2) show that in the sample of non-banks, the e¤ect of levies is small and insigni…cant in the baseline model and even negative when additional controls are introduced. Second, we estimate the e¤ect of the Austrian, French, Hungarian and Slovene bank levies, which did not create an incentive to rely more on equity funding. If our results were driven by unobserved characteristics of countries that chose to adopt bank levies rather than the changed incentives created by the levies themselves, we should expect to …nd an e¤ect on Austrian, French, Hungarian and Slovene banks similar to that on banks facing a levy on bank borrowing. We thus estimate the baseline model on a sample that includes banks in Austria, France, Hungary and Slovenia as well as banks in countries that did not introduce a levy. Columns (3)- (4) show that the coe¢ cient on the levy dummy is small and insigni…cant in the baseline model and almost exactly zero when additional 8 The sample period is extended to 2004-2011 to allow all levies to contribute to the identi…cation of the pre-levy trends 9 The sample is drawn from the database Amadeus and consists of the largest …rms in the EU with the size threshold chosen so as to roughly match the number of observations of the bank sample. controls are introduced. Table 5 around here We have conducted a number of other robustness tests, which are not included here due to space constraints (reported in the "Reviewer Appendix"). For instance, the positive e¤ect of levies on equity ratios is robust to including the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side; to estimating the model in …rst di¤erences; and to instrumenting the marginal levy rate, which is strictly speaking endogenous in countries with progressive levy rates, with the marginal levy rate that would have applied if banks had the exact same balance sheet as before the levies were introduced. 10 
Portfolio risk and total risk
While an increase in the equity-asset ratio is clearly an important objective of the bank levies, it is a concern that the levies may interact with regulation so as to induce banks to increase portfolio risk as highlighted by the conceptual framework.
To test whether bank levies have an e¤ect on portfolio risk, we estimate the baseline model with the average regulatory risk weight as dependent variable. Table 6 reports the results. Columns (1)- (2) show that the levies had a highly signi…cant e¤ect on portfolio risk regardless of which of the levy measures is used. Column (1) suggests that the average bank changed its portfolio when a bank levy was introduced with the result that the average risk weight increased by around 2 percentage points. The average value of the risk variable in the sample is around 0.60 so the estimate implies an increase in risk weights of around 3%. Column (2) shows that these results survive when using the marginal levy rate as explanatory variable. The coe¢ cient of around 0.5 suggests that the UK bank levy induced banks subject to the top marginal levy rate of 0.075% to increase the average risk weight of their assets by around 3.7 percentage points. Table 6 around here So far, our results have shown that bank levies were associated with a reduction in funding risk and an increase in portfolio risk. To estimate the net e¤ect of these two responses on total risk, we estimate (9) with the regulatory capital ratio as dependent variable. Columns (3)- (4) show that the e¤ect of the levies on capital ratios is positive and statistically signi…cant regardless of which of the levy measures is used. This suggests that the levies had a net positive impact on the robustness of the average bank. Speci…cally, column (3) suggests that the average bank increased its regulatory capital ratio by 0.8 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase of around 5%, when a bank levy was introduced. Column (4) suggests that a UK bank subject to the top marginal levy rate of 0.075% increased its regulatory capital ratio by around 1 percentage point in response to the levy.
Heterogeneity in responses
In the two previous sections, we estimated the e¤ect of the bank levies on the funding and portfolio choices of an average bank. However, if the incentive for risk shifting works through the regulatory capital requirement, as argued above, this e¤ect should be much stronger for banks that are e¤ectively constrained by this requirement.
We test these hypotheses by constructing separate dummy variables for banks with a ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets below the median ("low capital") and above the median ("high capital") respectively. We then introduce interactions between these two dummy variables and the levy measure into the model, which e¤ectively allows the e¤ect of bank levies to di¤er between the relatively "risky banks" and relatively "safe banks". Two caveats apply. First, we cannot allow the dummy variables for regulatory capital to vary over time since this would make them endogenous to risk taking. Hence, we de…ne the dummy variables in terms of regulatory capital ratios in 2008, which is exogenous to later changes in risk taking induced by the levies. Second, the initial regulatory capital ratio may itself be an important determinant of future changes in risk taking. This would be the case if, for instance, negative shocks to the regulatory capital ratio induce banks to reduce risk taking in future periods so as to return to their target regulatory capital ratio. We address this issue by introducing interactions between the two dummies for high and low regulatory capital and the time dummies. By conditioning the time trend on the initial regulatory capital ratio, we ensure that identi…cation e¤ectively derives from comparisons of banks with approximately the same initial regulatory capital ratio of which some were hit by a bank levy and some were not. Table 7 reports the results from applying the baseline model to each of the three outcome variables while allowing for heterogenous responses as described above.
Column (1) in
As expected, levies increase the equity-asset ratio for both types of banks, but the e¤ect is considerably larger for "safe banks" than for "risky banks" regardless of whether the levy dummy (panel A) or the marginal levy rate (panel B) is used as explanatory variable.
Also as expected, levies increase the average risk weight for "risky banks" but not nearly as much for "safe banks" (panels C and D). Finally, levies have a positive e¤ect on the regulatory capital ratio for "safe banks" but not for "risky banks" (panels E and F). Table 7 around here
The next columns explore the robustness of these results by introducing controls for other government interventions (column 2), region-speci…c non-linear time trends (column 3), bank size-speci…c non-linear time trends (column 4) and equity ratio-speci…c nonlinear time trends (column 5) separately and jointly (column 6). All the patterns of heterogeneous responses described above are fairly robust to the extensions. First, the estimated e¤ect of levies on equity-asset ratios is signi…cant for "safe banks" and larger than for "risky banks" in all speci…cations except one where the e¤ect is similarly sized (panel A -column 5). Second, the estimated e¤ect of levies on average risk weights is signi…cant for "risky banks" and larger than for "safe banks" in all speci…cations Finally, the estimated e¤ect of levies on regulatory capital ratios is signi…cant for "safe banks" and insigni…cant for "risky banks" in all speci…cations (only borderline signi…cance in panel F -column 5-6).
Behavioral mechanisms
In section (5.1), we documented a robust positive e¤ect of bank levies on equity-asset ratios. This section takes a closer look at the behavioral mechanisms through which the equity-asset ratios were a¤ected and reports the results in Table 8 .
For policy purposes, it is important whether the increase in the equity-asset ratio was achieved by a substitution of debt funding for equity funding for a given level of assets or by a reduction in assets for a given level of equity. In the latter case, the adverse e¤ects on the real economy could potentially be severe if the reduction in assets were driven by a contraction in lending to non-…nancial …rms. To test which of the two possible channels is most empirically relevant, we estimate the baseline model where the dependent variable is the equity stock (in logs) and the asset stock (in logs) respectively. Columns (1)- (2) show that equity stocks increased signi…cantly in response to the levies whereas columns (3)- (4) show that there was no signi…cant e¤ects on asset stocks. Table 8 around here Moreover, from the basic accounting de…nition of equity, it follows that there are three channels through which the stock of equity may have increased in response to the bank levies: (i) banks raised equity on the capital markets for instance through issues of new shares; (ii) banks reduced dividend payments to shareholders; (iii) banks earned larger pro…ts. While the …rst two channels represent real changes in …nancial policy that are consistent with the change in incentives, it would be di¢ cult to explain an e¤ect of levies on pro…tability. Ideally, we would like to know how much each of the three channels contributed to the estimated increase in equity or, at least, how much of the total e¤ect can be attributed to real changes in …nancial policy and how much is the e¤ect of changes in pro…tability. Since we are unable to obtain good measures of share issues and dividend payments, we take an indirect approach: we …rst compute an adjusted measure of equity that only re ‡ects active …nancial policy. In the starting year 2008, the adjusted equity measure equals actual equity whereas, in the years 2009-2011, it equals actual equity net of cumulated after-tax pro…ts since 2008. By eliminating the mechanical e¤ect of pro…ts on equity, the adjusted equity measure only changes when banks raise equity and pay out dividends. We then estimate the baseline model using this adjusted equity measure.
Columns (5)- (6) show that the e¤ect of levies on adjusted equity is comparable to and in one case even slightly larger than the baseline results suggesting that the estimated increase in equity-asset ratios fully re ‡ects changes in banks'…nancial policy.
Concluding remarks
In the wake of the …nancial crisis, a number of countries have introduced bank levies in an attempt to reduce risk in the …nancial sector. This paper has studied how the levies introduced by the countries of the EU a¤ected banks'funding and portfolio choices with the ultimate aim of assessing whether the levies met this objective.
We …rst showed that the levies were associated with an average increase in equityasset ratios of around 1 to 1.5 percentage points. The increase in the equity-asset ratio was shown to re ‡ect active …nancial policy such as share issues and changes in dividend policy rather than a contraction of the balance. These …ndings suggest that levies are associated with a considerable reduction in banks'funding risk. We then showed that the levies caused a sizable increase in regulatory risk-weights for the average bank. These results suggest that banks may have responded to the levies by shifting risk from the liability side to the asset side of the balance sheet. For the average bank, however, the increase in portfolio risk is su¢ ciently small that the net e¤ect of the levies is to reduce total risk.
Finally, we explored the heterogeneity in responses to the bank levies by splitting the sample into "risky banks" with a low initial regulatory capital ratio and "safe banks" with a high initial regulatory capital ratio. We found that while "safe banks" increased their equity-asset ratio most in response to the levies, only "risky banks" increased the risk of their assets so that while "safe banks" experienced a considerable reduction in total risk, there was no such e¤ect for "risky banks". This is consistent with the conceptual framework that indicates that "risky banks", closer to being initially constrained by regulatory capital requirements, switch their risk from the funding side to the portfolio side in response to a tax on the funding side.
The results speak to current policy debates about banking regulation. The Basel III agreements introduce the requirement that the ratio of regulatory capital to assets (i.e. the leverage ratio) exceed a threshold of 3%. This complements the existing capital requirement with respect to the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. Our …nding that funding risk and portfolio risk are substitutes suggests that the new minimum leverage ratio could be of limited value. It is true that highly leveraged banks may be forced to raise more equity to reach the minimum leverage ratio. However, to the extent that the risk choices of these banks were initially constrained by the existing capital requirement, they are likely to take advantage of the room for additional portfolio risk created by the additional equity to leave total risk una¤ected.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
Assuming W L = 0 and W = 0, then totally di¤erentiating (7) and (8), and noting
and hence
where
Substituting for B and D and their derivatives with respect to L and , and rearranging, it is possible to derive the following expressions for the elements of (11) .
Assuming that L is su¢ ciently small for this to be true, then < 0 is a su¢ cient condition for W LL < 0, W < 0, W L < 0 and > 0, in which case Proposition 1 follows, and the second order conditions of the maximization hold. Germany 0.000% up to €300 million 2011 0.020% up to €10 billion 0.030% up to €100 billion 0.040% up to €200 billion 0.050% up to €300 billion 0.060% above €300 billion 
Equity / Assets
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of book equity to assets; levy is a dummy variable at the country-year level taking the value one when there is a bank levy in place; marginal levy rate is an estimate at the bank-year level of the levy saving created by subsituting one unit of debt with one unit of equity; log assets is the log of assets; log assets squared is the log of assets squared; profitability is the ratio of pre-tax profits to assets; inflation is the rate of inflation at the country-year level; gdp growth is the rate of GDP growth at the country-year level; corporate tax rate is the corporate tax rate at the country-year level; dummy 2009 is a dummy variable indicating that the year is 2009. 
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of book equity to assets; levy is a dummy variable at the country-year level taking the value one when there is a bank levy in place; marginal levy rate is an estimate at the bank-year level of the levy saving created by subsituting one unit of debt with one unit of equity; controls for government interventions include the value of government debt guarantees and recapitalization relative to bank assets and a dummy for intervention by the EU regulatory authorities; region indicates one of five regions in the EU; size indicates the 10 size deciles in 2008; equity ratio indicates the 10 equity ratio deciles in 2008. All equations include the variables: log assets: log assets squared, profitability, inflation, gdp growth and the corporate tax rate. Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of book equity to assets; levy is a dummy variable at the country-year level taking the value one when there is a bank levy in place. All equations include the variables: log assets: log assets squared, profitability, inflation, gdp growth and the corporate tax rate. In columns (1)- (2), the sample consists of non-financial firms drawn from the Amadeus database so as to maintain the number of observation from each country as in the baseline regression. In columns (3)- (4), the consists of banks from countries with no levies as well as Austria, France, Slovenia and Hungary. Note: In columns (1-)-(2), the dependent variable is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to assets whereas in columns (3)- (4) it is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk weighted assets; levy is a dummy variable at the country-year level taking the value one when there is a bank levy in place; marginal levy rate is an estimate at the bank-year level of the levy saving created by subsituting one unit of debt with one unit of equity; log assets is the log of assets; log assets squared is the log of assets squared; profitability is the ratio of pre-tax profits to assets; inflation is the rate of inflation at the countryyear level; gdp growth is the rate of GDP growth at the country-year level; corporate tax rate is the corporate tax rate at the country-year level; dummy 2009 is a dummy variable indicating that the year is 2009. 
Regulatory capital / Risk weighted assets
Note: In panels A-B the dependent variable is the ratio of book equity to assets; in panels B-C, it is the ratio of risk weighted assets to assets; in panels E-F, it is the ratio of regulatory capital to risk weighted assets; levy is a dummy indicating that a bank levy in place; marginal levy rate is an estimate of the levy saving created by subsituting one unit of debt with one unit of equity; low capital is a dummy for a regulatory capital ratio below the median in 2008; high capital is a dummy for a regulatory capital ratio above the median in 2008; controls for government interventions include the value of government debt guarantees and recapitalization relative to bank assets and a dummy for intervention by the EU regulatory authorities; region indicates one of five regions in the EU; size indicates the 10 size deciles in 2008; equity ratio indicates the 10 equity ratio deciles in 2008. All equations include the variables: log assets, log assets squared , profitability , inflation , gdp growth and the corporate tax rate . 
Log equity Log assets Adjusted equity / Assets
Note: In columns (1)- (2), the dependent variable is the log of equity; in columns (3-(4) it is the log of assets; in columns (5)- (6), it is the ratio of equity to assets purged for the mechanical effect of profits since 2008; levy is a dummy variable at the country-year level taking the value one when there is a bank levy in place; marginal levy rate is an estimate at the bank-year level of the levy saving created by subsituting one unit of debt with one unit of equity; All equations include the variables: log assets: log assets squared, profitability, inflation, gdp growth, the corporate tax rate and time fixed dummies (1)- (4) and (9)- (10), the dependent variable is the ratio of equity to assets; in columns (5)- (8) it is the first-difference in the ratio of equity to assets; levy is a dummy variable at the country-year level taking the value one when there is a bank levy in place; marginal levy rate is an estimate at the bank-year level of the levy saving created by subsituting one unit of debt with one unit of equity; log assets is the log of assets; log assets squared is the log of assets squared; profitability is the ratio of pre-tax profits to assets; inflation is the rate of inflation at the country-year level; gdp growth is the rate of GDP growth at the country-year level; corporate tax rate is the corporate tax rate at the country-year level. In columns (9)-(10), the marginal levy rate is instrumented with the marginal levy rate that would have applied had the bank had the exact same balance sheet as in 2008.
